Akira Okada
Office
Graduate School of Economics
Hitotsubashi University
2-1 Naka, Kunitachi 186-8601
Japan
Phone: +81 42 580 8599
Fax : +81 42 580 8748
E-mail: aokada"at"econ.hit-u.ac.jp
Research interests
Game Theory, Bargaining Theory, Experimental Economics, Cooperation and Conflict
Recent works and selected publications
Discussion papers
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
"A Noncooperative Approach to General n-Person Cooperative Game"
#2005-1, 2005.
"Group Formation and Heterogeneity in Collective Action Games,"
(with Toshimasa Maruta), #2005-7, 2005.
"Coalitional Bargaining Games with Random Proposers: Theory and Application."
#2007-10, 2007.
"Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games with Multiple Populations,"
(with Toshimasa Maruta), #2009-1, 2009.
"Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core"
#2009-16, 2009.
"Dynamic Group Formation in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma"
(with Toshimasa Maruta)
Bargaining Theory
"A Noncooperative Approach to the Nash Bargaining Problem,"
In R. Selten(ed.) Game Equilibrium Models III - Strategic Bargaining,
Springer-Verlag, 1991, 7-34.
"Noncooperative Bargaining and the Core of an n-Person CharacteristicFunction Game,"
Control and Cybernetics 21, 1992, 231 - 250.
"A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers,"
Games and Economic Behavior 16, 1996, 97-108.
"The Efficiency Principle in Non-cooperative Coalitional Bargaining,"
Japanese Economic Review 51, 2000, 34-50.
"A Noncooperative Axiomatization of the Core" (with Eyal Winter),
Theory and Decision 53(1), 2003, 1-28.
"nefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game: Experimental Evidence"
(with Arno Riedl), Games and Economic Behavior 50, 2005, 278-311.
"Riskless versus Risky Bargaining Procedures: The Aumann-Roth Controversy Revisited"
(with Maria Montero), Japanese Economic Review 58, 294-302, 2007.
Cooperation and Conflict
"The Possibility of Cooperation in an n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements,"
Public Choice 77, 1993, 629-656.
"The Organization of Social Cooperation: A Noncooperative Approach,"
In W. Gueth et al. (eds.), Understanding Strategic Interaction - Essays
in Honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 228-242.
"The Dynamic Transformation of Political Systems through Social Contract:A Game Theoretic Approach"
(with Kenichi Sakakibara and Koichi Suga),
Social Choice and Welfare, 14, 1997, 1-21.
"The Second-Order Dilemma of Public Goods and Capital Accumulation,"
Public Choice 135, 2008, 165-182.
"Institution Formation in Public Goods Games"(with Michael Kosfeld and
Arno Riedl), American Economic Review 99, 1335-55, 2009.
Foundations of Non-cooperative Game Theory
"On Stability of Perfect Equilibrium Points,"
International Journal of Game Theory 10, 1981, 67-73.
"A Note on the Perfectness Concept and the Information Structures of Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory 10, 1981, 133-136.
"Strictly Perfect Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory 13, 1984, 145-154.
"Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games,"
(with Masakazu Kojima and Susumu Shindoh), Mathematics of Operations
Research 10, 1985, 650-663.
"Complete Inflation and Perfect Recall in Extensive Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory 16, 1987, 85-91.
"Perfect Equilibrium Points and Lexicographic Domination,"
International Journal of Game Theory 17, 1988, 225-239.
"Lexicographic Domination in Extensive Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory 20, 1991, 95-108.