

A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof *

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Abstract

We search for *stable* and *strategy-proof* rules in the context of one-to-one matching problems. We advocate new conditions for preference domains, named *the no detour condition for women* and *the no detour condition for men*, and show that in environments where the sets of preferences for all men (*resp.* women) are not restricted, the following three statements are logically equivalent; (i) the preference domain satisfies *the no detour condition for women (resp. men)*, (ii) there exists a *stable* and *strategy-proof* rule, (iii) there exists a *stable* and *coalition strategy-proof* rule.

Keywords: Stability; Strategy-Proofness; Coalition Strategy-Proofness; Two-Sided Matching.

JEL Classification: C78, D71, D78.

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